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withhold relief without causing immediate monetary or
other direct injury to the party raising the constitutional
issue as previously suggested.35 All cases previously dis-
cussed herein where the self-imposed rule excluding stand-
ing to raise another's rights has been applied were cases of
a plaintiff volunteering the constitutional rights of others
as a basis for injunctive or declaratory relief (and without
showing threat of immediate harm to plaintiff for which
he had no other remedy). In the instant case, there was a
"case" or "controversy" before the tribunal so as to satisfy
the constitutional rule, and the respondent was not volun-
teering an attack upon state action but was asserting a
defense in order to avoid a direct pocketbook injury. This
would seem to distinguish the situation from the other cases
where the rule was applied and to eliminate the need for
concluding that the Court was making any serious excep-
tion to the rule.
CONTRIBUTION - METHODS OF ENFORCING
O'Keefe v. Baltimore Transit Co.'
The original cause of action in this suit arose out of a
collision between appellant's taxicab and appellee's street-
car on February 18, 1947, at Dundalk and St. Helena Ave-
nues. Suits were instituted on July 17, 1947, by the cab pas-
sengers against appellant and appellee, but before trial the
Transit Company obtained, on June 19, 1948, the proper
releases whereby the claims against both the defendants
were discharged in full. Having paid the total consideration
for the general releases, the Transit Company instituted
a new and separate action for contribution while the origi-
nal suits were still open on the docket, the releases not
having been filed therein. It obtained a judgment for one-
half the price paid for the releases, from which the defen-
dant appeals. Held: Affirmed.
The primary2 argument of the cab company was that
the Transit Company could not, without the consent and
participation of appellant in the settlement, institute a new
and separate proceeding for contribution while the original
suit was still pending. In support appellant cited from the
Supra, n. 26.
194 A. 2d 26 (Md., 1953).
2 Appellant also contended that the evidence was insufficient to show con-
current negligence on its part.
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"Procedure and Practice" section of the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Joint Tort Feasors Act.'
But the Court pointed out that Section 26 of Article 50
has been expressly superseded by the new Rules,4 effective
January 1, 1948, and the streetcar company's right to con-
tribution did not arise until the releases were obtained on
June 19, 1948.1 Since the new Rules do not obliterate exist-
ing substantial rights, but merely affect the procedure for
enforcing these rights, the Court applied the new Rules in
the present case.' The Court said:'
"There is no requirement in these rules that an
action for contribution must be brought in the original
action and cannot be brought in an independent action.
Of course, one purpose of the new Rules is to avoid
multiplicity of suits. By bringing this independent
action it was not necessary to proceed further with the
three pending suits."
It therefore appears that three proceedings are possible
whereby a defendant may obtain contribution from a joint
tort feasor co-defendant.
1. The defendant may assert a cross-claim against the
co-defendant on which a judgment can be obtained
upon trial of the whole proceeding, or, if the plain-
tiff's claim has been settled, still maintain such claim
as part of the original proceeding.8
2. After a joint judgment has been obtained by the
plaintiff, one defendant, by payment of all or more
than his pro-rata share, may move, upon fifteen (15)
days notice and proof of payment, for a Judgment
of Recovery Over, as part of the original proceeding.9
3. Where no cross-claim has been asserted and settle-
ment is effected before judgment, the defendant
extinguishing the common liability may institute a
new proceeding for contribution, on the authority
of the present case.
3 Md. Code (1951), Art. 50, Sec. 26(c), (formerly Sec. 27).
4 General Rules of Practice and Procedure, Part 2, III, Joinder Rule 7(4).
1 Md. Code (1951), Art. 50, Sec. 21 (b).
0Citing Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. 90, 98, 166 A. 593 (1933) ; Kelch v.
Keehn, 183 Md. 140, 144, 36 A. 2d 544 (1944).
Supra, n. 1, 28.
'Rules, 8upra, n. 4, III, Joinder Rule 3(b), 6(d).
'Ibid, Rule 6(e).
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The Court did not deal in express terms with the appel-
lant's argument that the action could not be maintained
because the cab company did not participate in, or consent
to, the settlement. It was pointed out in the opinion though,
that the evidence was sufficient to show that the settlement
figure was not excessive, as brought out by the testimony of
claims experts.'"
However, this argument was raised before the Municipal
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." After citing
the Maryland Code Supplement (1947), Art. 50, Sec. 22 (a),
(b) and (c) (Sec. 21 of 1951 Code), the Court said:' 2
"It will be seen at a glance that these sections make
no mention of notice. But appellant urges us to rule
that notice is required by implication. The case is one
of first impression. Neither counsel nor this Court has
discovered any decisions under the Uniform Act in
which the question of notice was decided or apparently
even discussed."
And further: 11
"The statute names only two conditions which must
be met before a joint tort feasor is entitled to contribu-
tion from another following a settlement: (1) Pay-
ment of the common liability or more than a pro rata
share thereof; and (2) Liability of the second tort
feasor to the injured person must be extinguished.
"We know of no principle which would permit us to
make notice a third requirement when the statute is
silent on the subject."
This is certainly the sound position since the defendant
must first be proved jointly liable 4 and he can always try
to show that the compromises were not made honestly or
in good faith, or that the amounts paid were unreasonable
or excessive. 5
10 Supra, n. 1, 31; Of. Congressional Country Club v. B. & 0. R. Co., 194
Md. 533, 544, 71 A. 2d 696 (1950).
u Hodges v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., et al., 91 A. 2d 473
(D. C., 1952).
Ibid, 474.
Ibid, 475.
" East Coast Lines v. M. & C. C. of Balto., 190 Md. 256, 279, 58 A. 2d
290 (1948).
'Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S. W. 2d 16, 85
A. L. R. 1086, 1090 (1932).
